In January 2025, Nigeria witnessed a paradoxical situation in its downstream oil sector. Despite the much-celebrated inauguration of domestic refineries, including the Dangote Refinery and the revitalized Port Harcourt and Warri refineries, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) and other major marketers continued to import substantial volumes of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS, or petrol) and Automotive Gas Oil (AGO, or diesel). This continued reliance on imports, totaling over 633 million litres for the month, contradicted earlier pronouncements by marketers and the government to prioritize domestically refined products and reduce dependence on foreign sources, a key contributor to the devaluation of the naira.
The NNPCL alone imported over 212 million litres of petrol and 120 million litres of diesel within the first 29 days of January. This action was considered baffling by industry experts, given the publicized operational commencement of the Port Harcourt and Warri refineries, with a combined capacity of 335,000 barrels per day. These refineries were touted as crucial steps towards achieving national fuel self-sufficiency, and their operational status raises questions about their actual contribution to the domestic supply. The government had officially announced the resumption of petrol production at the Port Harcourt refinery in November 2024, showcasing the facility and its output to stakeholders and emphasizing the immediate commencement of truck loading. Similarly, the Warri refinery was also declared operational shortly after, with a focus on producing essential products like kerosene, diesel, and naphtha.
Despite these developments and public commitments to prioritize local refining, the NNPCL proceeded to import fuel via nine vessels docking at various ports across the country. The imported petrol, totaling over 172 million litres, arrived at the Apapa, Tin Can, and Calabar ports, while the imported diesel, amounting to over 74 million litres, was received at Lagos ports. The continued importation by the NNPCL, the nation’s leading oil company and a key player in the refinery rehabilitation projects, creates a significant disconnect between the proclaimed goal of self-sufficiency and the actual practices in the downstream sector.
Alongside the NNPCL, other major oil marketers, including Bovas, A.A. Rano, Matrix, Raj, and AYM Shafa, also contributed to the import figures, bringing in a combined total of 246 million litres of petrol and nearly 100 million litres of diesel. These marketers, along with several others, received their shipments at ports in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Warri, further highlighting the sustained dependence on foreign fuel sources despite the availability of domestic refining capacity. Matrix emerged as the largest importer among these marketers, accounting for over 126 million litres of imported fuel.
The rationale offered for this continued importation varied. While some attributed it to bridging perceived domestic supply gaps, others questioned the need given the significant investments in domestic refining infrastructure, particularly the $20 billion Dangote Refinery, which alone possesses the capacity to meet a substantial portion of Nigeria’s fuel demand. The apparent contradiction between stated policy and actual practice raises concerns about transparency and the genuine commitment to reducing import dependency.
Explaining the situation, the National Publicity Secretary of the Independent Petroleum Marketers Association of Nigeria (IPMAN), Chinedu Ukadike, suggested that the Port Harcourt refinery, despite being officially operational, was still functioning at a suboptimal level. He acknowledged the NNPCL’s earlier commitment to prioritize locally refined products but pointed out that the Port Harcourt refinery’s output remained insufficient to meet demand. Ukadike indicated that the NNPCL’s CEO had acknowledged the refinery’s suboptimal performance and the ongoing efforts to reach full capacity. He further suggested that the NNPCL’s continued importation was likely a strategy to ensure a consistent supply to its retail outlets while awaiting the full operationalization of domestic refineries. This explanation, however, does not fully address the significant volumes imported, given the combined capacity of the existing and newly operational refineries.
