The recent removal of Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo has sparked a crucial debate about the proper application of Article 146 of the Ghanaian Constitution, the provision that outlines the process for removing judicial officers. Paul Adom-Otchere, host of Good Evening Ghana, has voiced his concern, arguing that the dismissal sets a worrying precedent and that mistakes in judicial rulings should not be conflated with misconduct, the threshold required for invoking Article 146. He emphasized the importance of preserving the judiciary’s independence and cautioned against using this constitutional provision as a political weapon.
The sequence of events leading to Justice Torkornoo’s removal began with a petition filed by businessman Daniel Ofori in March 2025, alleging misconduct against the then-Chief Justice. Following established protocol, the President, after reviewing the petition, Justice Torkornoo’s response, and advice from the Council of State, formed a committee to investigate the claims. The committee’s findings ultimately led to her dismissal. While the specifics of the allegations and the committee’s findings haven’t been fully disclosed in this context, the focus of the current debate centers on the broader implications of using Article 146 to address perceived judicial errors.
Adom-Otchere’s core argument rests on the distinction between fallibility and misconduct. He acknowledges that the Supreme Court, like any human institution, is susceptible to errors in judgment. He points out that existing legal mechanisms can address such errors without resorting to the drastic measure of removing a Chief Justice. Appeals processes, dissenting opinions, and legislative actions can all serve as corrective measures within the framework of a functioning democracy. Using Article 146 to address simple legal errors, he contends, undermines the stability and independence of the judiciary, setting a dangerous precedent for future politically motivated removals.
Furthermore, Adom-Otchere highlighted the potential for politicization of Article 146. He linked Justice Torkornoo’s removal to her previous ruling in the “vacant seat” case, a decision that drew criticism from the then-opposition party. The subsequent celebration of her dismissal by certain individuals on social media, he suggests, underscores the partisan undertones surrounding the entire affair. This politicization, he argues, poses a substantial threat to the judiciary’s integrity, as it creates the perception that judicial decisions are subject to political retribution rather than impartial legal scrutiny.
The concerns raised by Adom-Otchere reflect a broader anxiety about the potential misuse of Article 146. While the provision is designed to hold judicial officers accountable for genuine misconduct, its application in cases of perceived errors or politically unpopular decisions could erode public trust in the judiciary’s impartiality. This, in turn, could undermine the rule of law and create a climate of fear among judges, potentially influencing their decisions and jeopardizing their ability to adjudicate cases fairly and without fear of political reprisal.
The debate surrounding Justice Torkornoo’s removal underscores a fundamental tension in democratic governance: the need for accountability balanced against the equally crucial need for an independent judiciary. While mechanisms for addressing judicial misconduct are necessary, their application must be carefully considered to avoid chilling the judiciary’s independence. The case highlights the importance of transparency and due process in the application of Article 146 and the need for a broader public conversation about the appropriate boundaries between legitimate criticism of judicial decisions and actions that threaten the very foundations of an independent justice system. The future of judicial independence in Ghana may well hinge on how this delicate balance is maintained.
